![]() In dissent, Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Castille, criticized the majority's "unworkable and radical departure from our accepted law regarding witness immunity." The dissent argues that there was "no bright line" between the professional negligence in forming an opinion and the substance of an opinion. Justice Zappala, writing for the majority, maintained that the holding in LLMD is consistent with Panitz while experts may be sued for professional negligence, experts may not be sued by a party that is simply "dissatisfied with the substance of the opinion rendered by an expert." Therefore, the Court's limited holding will NOT expose experts to liability when his opinions are challenged by "another expert or authoritative source." In Panitz, the Superior Court declined to hold an expert witness liable where she admitted on cross-examination that some of her testimony was inaccurate. The Court was careful to distinguish the Superior Court's prior holding in Panitz v. by requiring that an expert witness render services to the degree of care, skill and proficiency commonly exercised by the ordinary skillful, careful and prudent members of their profession." The Court stated that the true furtherance of the law "will be enhanced. But, the Court observed that shielding professionals from their own negligence does not further the policies of truth and free disclosure. The Court recognized that the doctrine of witness immunity is founded on the policy "that the paths which lead to the ascertainment of truth should be left as free and unobstructed as possible." Under the protection of immunity, witnesses should not be afraid to come forward for fear of liability or be inclined to color testimony. LLMD appealed again, and in a 4 to 2 decision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, changing the scope of the doctrine of witness immunity by holding that the doctrine does not protect expert witnesses who are negligent in forming their opinions. LLMD appealed, and the Superior Court affirmed on the grounds of witness immunity. The trial court granted summary judgment for Jackson-Cross on a variety of grounds, after denying summary judgment on the issue of witness immunity. LLMD sued Jackson-Cross for professional malpractice. ![]() Jackson-Cross later gave LLMD a new calculation, showing lost profits of only $2.7 million dollars. The court struck the expert witness' testimony and the Plaintiff was forced to accept a settlement offer of $750,000. Because he had not performed the calculations himself, the expert could neither explain the error nor recalculate the lost profits on the stand he conceded that the calculation was wrong due to the error. On cross, however, the defense revealed that the calculation contained a mathematical error. Using a computerized spreadsheet which he had not personally prepared, but which had been prepared in his office, the Jackson-Cross expert testified that LLMD had suffered a loss of $6 million. LLMD hired Jackson-Cross to provide expert testimony on lost profits resulting from a breach of contract. In a surprising change of the common law tradition of witness immunity, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently held that the doctrine of witness immunity does not protect expert witnesses who are negligent in forming their opinions.
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